Economic models that do not incorporate financial frictions only explain about 70 to 80 percent of the decline in world trade that occurred in the 2008-2009 crisis. We review some of the evidence that shows financial factors also contributed to the great trade collapse, and we uncover two new stylized facts in support of it. First, we show that the prices of manufactured exports rose relative to domestic prices during the crisis. Second, we show that U.S. seaborne exports and imports, which are likely to be more sensitive to trade finance problems, saw their prices rise relative to goods shipped by air or land.
I. What is Trade Finance and Why does it Matter For Exports?
At the most basic level, trade finance consists of borrowing using trade credit (accounts receivable) as collateral and/or the purchase of insurance against the possibility of trade credit defaults. In traditional trade finance contracts, exporters obtain working capital loans, credit lines, discounted prepayments, or credit default insurance based on foreign purchase orders or credit guarantees provided by the importer's bank. Exporters tend to be much more heavy users of trade finance than domestic firms because international transactions tend to take much longer to execute than domestic transactions and because of the perceived higher risk of international transactions. As Amiti and Weinstein (2009) have argued, the higher sensitivity of exports to financial forces provides a reason why exports should be more susceptible to financial shocks than domestic sales. Ahn (2010) formalized and expanded on this intuition by developing the first general equilibrium framework for understanding why trade is particularly sensitive to financial shocks.
There are several reasons why these normally quiet markets may have provided an important conduit through which financial shocks affected trade flows in the recent crisis. First, Lehman's default caused interbank lending markets to seize up. As one can see in the LIBOR-OIS spread 1 in Figure 1 , the Lehman bankruptcy caused the spread to rise sharply in most countries. This dramatic rise in interbank borrowing rates is strong evidence in favor of the idea that banks were facing enormous difficulties raising short term funds. The higher borrowing costs were naturally passed through to trade finance contracts since these contracts are typically indexed to interbank rates. However, the impact of the financial crisis on the trade finance market was even larger. Six of Lehman's thirty largest unsecured creditors were institutions providing letters of credit (Amiti and Weinstein (2009) dependence by looking at whether industries with high levels of accounts receivable relative to sales were hit harder. A problem with this measure is that trade finance has ambiguous effects on this ratio -more trade finance enables companies to finance their accounts receivable, but also many trade finance products like letters of credit and export factoring enable exporters to remove trade credits from their balance sheets in exchange for discounted prepayments.
Indeed, the impact of credit problems affecting these export factors are likely to be extremely hard to discern using only aggregate data on interbank rates and sectoral finance dependence. CIT, for instance, was a major export factor in 2008 with $80 billion of assets that received $2.3 billion in TARP funds. At the time of its bankruptcy in 2009, CIT had over a million customers in over 50 countries spread across 30 industries. 2 As this example illustrates, it is probably quite difficult to capture the effects of massive trade-finance-related insolvencies without matched exporter-financial institution data.
II. Do Price Movements Indicate an Export Supply Shock?
Despite the substantial data problems associated with identification, one can conjecture that if the trade finance mattered in macro data, it would appear as a form of supply shock to exporters. The problem of discerning trade finance shocks from the data is that exporters were also buffeted by a series of demand shocks. However, some studies have provided evidence that supply shocks were particularly important for exporters. For example, Levchenko et al. (2010a) find that automobile imports -which fell quite rapidly in the crisis -actually experienced a rise in import prices. This seems to contradict the notion suggested by Alessandria et al. (2010) that the key driver of the decline in automobile sales was demand. Similarly, Hadad et al. (2010) decompose the declines in imports in the U.S. and E.U. and find that import prices of manufactures actually rose in these countries: a fact that is more consistent with relatively large falls in imports arising from relatively large supply contractions.
We can also see these forces in operation by looking at the aggregate price evidence.
Overall, the prices of manufacturing goods fell sharply in the EU, Japan, and the US, so there is no question that the global economy was hit by a massive demand shock. This is the basis of the seventy percent solution. However, there is also some evidence of supply shocks differentially affecting exporters.
We can examine this more generally by looking at what happened to export prices relative to domestic producer prices. Our approach is to construct measures of the log change in export prices less the log change in producer prices for a series of OECD countries. Figure 2 shows the plot for the U.S. As one can see from the graph, U.S. non-agricultural export prices staged their highest relative price increase in the first several quarters after the Lehman bankruptcy that they had experienced in the last ten years. And this happened in spite of the fact that the trade weighted dollar appreciated over this time period.
Figure 3 repeats this exercise for the countries of the European Union using Eurostat data for manufacturing exports and output. Once again the same pattern emerges. European exporters raised their prices relative to domestic manufacturers. 3 Similarly, as we can see in Figure 4 , Japan, which suffered the largest quarterly decline in exports of any OECD country during the crisis (a 20 percent decline in the export to GDP ratio in the first quarter of 2009), also saw its export prices rise sharply relative to its producer prices. The fact that exporters in the U.S., E.U., and Japan -which jointly accounted for 51 percent of world exports in 2009 -raised their relative export prices suggests that exports may have been facing a larger supply shock than domestic sales. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) argue that the greater shipping times mean that trade financing needs are likely to be more important for goods shipped by sea than those shipped by air because exporters shipping by sea need more short-term working capital financing and face greater payment default risk while their goods are in transit. For the U.S., goods shipped by land from Canada and Mexico also have quite short shipping times. Therefore, we examine whether goods shipped by sea, which were likely to be more susceptible to trade finance shocks, experienced greater price increases than goods shipped by air or land.
We use monthly U.S. bilateral export and import data at the HS-10 level by mode of transport from the Census Bureau for the period from January 2007 through July 2010 for all manufactured goods. 4 One problem with these data is that the quantity information at the HS-10 level by country is not produced by mode of transport. Fortunately, at this level of aggregation most goods exported to or imported from a country are done so predominantly using a single mode of transport. We therefore categorized shipments as "seaborne" if more than 90 percent of the value of the goods exported to or imported from a country in a particular month were done by sea. Similarly, we classified goods as "not seaborne" if more than 90 percent of the shipments were not done by sea. We were able to classify 84 percent of exports and 83 percent of imports in this manner as either seaborne or not-seaborne and construct unit value accordingly.
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Our basic regression specification is presented below ln , where, p hct is the unit value of HS code h exported to or imported from country c in month t, SEA hct is an indicator variable that equals one if the shipment was made by sea and CRISIS t is an indicator variable if the shipment occurred during the financial crisis, and all Greek variables are parameters to be estimated. Our specification includes a full set of HS-time and country-time dummies which should eliminate any good-specific or country specific demand shock such as macro or exchange rate shocks. Based on Figure 1 , we use two definitions for the crisis period. The results from this estimation exercise are presented in Table 1 . The coefficient on the sea dummy is negative indicating that goods shipped by sea tend to be substantially cheaper than goods shipped by air. What is most interesting from our perspective is that goods exported by sea tended to see their FOB prices rise by about 3 percent relative to goods shipped by air or land during the crisis period. Similarly, U.S. seaborne imports saw their prices rise by 2 percent relative to goods delivered by land and sea during the crisis period. In other words, we see that the prices of goods that are likely to be the most sensitive to trade finance shocks were the ones that experienced the greatest relative price increases. While this evidence is not as clear cut as the firm-level evidence in Amiti and Weinstein (2009) and Paravasini et al. (2010) , it is suggestive of the idea that supply shocks in trade finance intensive transactions contributed to the decline in world trade during the crisis.
III. Conclusion
While there is no question that demand played a predominant part in the decline in world trade, there is increasing evidence that the liquidity contractions that rocked the financial world also played a part. Firm level evidence indicates that exporters whose financial institutions became credit constrained cut back on exports more than other firms, and imports declined more in sectors that had greater external financial dependence. This paper shows that some of these shocks may have appeared in price movements. Export prices rose relative to domestic manufacturing prices during the crisis and the prices of seaborne imports and exports -which are more sensitive to financial shocks -rose relative to goods sent by land or air. These are all indicative of important supply side shocks that may help us move beyond the seventy percent solution. 
